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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-INTRAMEDIA DIFFERENTIAL
TAX SCHEME UPHELD. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
The Arkansas Legislature adopted Act 1881 in 1987.2 Act 188
amended Arkansas' Gross Receipts Act (GRA)3 to include a sales tax
on cable television services." The amended GRA continued to expressly
exempt receipts from subscription and over-the-counter newspaper sales
and subscription magazine sales.' Prior to the adoption of Act 188, the
GRA made no mention of cable television or satellite broadcast
services. 6
Consequently, Daniel L. Medlock, a cable television subscriber,
along with a cable operator and a cable organization (cable petition-
ers),7 brought a class action in Arkansas Chancery Court "to challenge
the extension of the sales tax to cable television services." The cable
petitioners argued that the taxation of cable services, when compared
with the tax exemptions and exclusions granted to newspapers,
magazines, and satellite broadcast services, violated their constitutional
rights under the First Amendment9 and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 0
The chancery court noted the inherent necessity in cable television
of using public rights-of-way to lay its cables. The court found this
distinction sufficient to justify different treatment between cable televi-
1. 1987 Ark. Acts 409 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-301 (Michie 1991)).
2. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1441 (1991).
3. Id. The GRA had imposed a 4% sales tax on tangible personal property and specified
services. Id.
4. The services to be taxed included (1) "all service charges and rental charges whether for
basic service, or premium channels or other special service . . . (2) installation and repair service
charges, and (3) any other charges having any connection with the providing of cable television
services." Medlock v. Pledger, 301 Ark. 483, 484, 785 S.W.2d 202, 203 (1990).
5. 111 S. Ct. at 1441.
6. Id.
7. Aside from Medlock, this action was brought by Community Communications Co., a
cable television operator, and the Arkansas Cable Television Association, Inc., a trade organiza-
tion consisting of approximately 80 cable operator members. Id.
8. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The amendment reads in relevant part, "Congress shall make no
law .. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. ... "
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The section reads in relevant part "No State shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
11. 111 S. Ct. at 1441.
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sion and other forms of media that were exempt from the sales tax. 2
Thus, the court upheld the constitutionality of Act 188.13 Shortly after
this decision, Arkansas adopted Act 76914 extending the sales tax to
satellite television and similar services.'8
Despite the adoption of Act 769, cable petitioners appealed to the
Arkansas Supreme Court claiming that Act 188 unconstitutionally dis-
criminated against cable television.1 6 The court rejected the chancery
court's conclusion that differential tax treatment is justified because of
cable television's use of public rights-of-way.' 7 The court reasoned that
although the First Amendment does not prohibit differential taxation of
different media, it does prohibit differential taxation among members
of the same medium. 18 The court found that cable and satellite services
were essentially the same.' 9 Therefore, the court concluded that "Ar-
kansas' sales tax was unconstitutional under the First Amendment for
the period during which cable television but not satellite broadcast ser-
vices were subject to the tax."2 0
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari upon the pe-
tition of the Arkansas Commissioner of Revenues and the cable peti-
tioners .2 The Court held that Act 188 was not unconstitutional under
the First Amendment. 2 The Court reasoned that a "generally applica-
ble" tax which extended to cable television services but exempted other
media was not unconstitutional differential taxation.2 3 In coming to this
conclusion, the Court recognized that the Arkansas Legislature's adop-
tion of Act 188 revealed no intent to discriminate against a particular
medium on the basis of the ideas conveyed by the medium. Addition-
ally, the effect of the tax was unlike constitutionally suspect content-
based regulation because it did not operate to suppress a small number
of particular speakers .2 Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 1989 Ark. Acts 769 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-301 (Michie 1991)).
15. 111 S. Ct. at 1441-42.
16. Id. at 1442.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Certiorari granted in III S. Ct. 41, 42 (1990).
22. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. at 1447. The case was decided by a 7-2 majority.
23. Id. at 1447.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1444-45.
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For the past 200 years, the First Amendment has been largely in-
terpreted as if it read "freedom of speech, including freedom of the
press." 26 Actually, the two phrases are coordinate.2 7 'Although the press
has recently begun to assert rights arising specifically from the Press
Clause, 28 "[t]hus far the Supreme Court has declined to give indepen-
dent significance to the phrase 'freedom of the press.' "29 Additionally,
the Court has refused to find in the Free Speech and Press Clauses any
special privileges or protections for the institutional press.30 Although
the distinctive function of the press in the First Amendment scheme is
generally recognized by the courts, the press receives no more protec-
tion because of the Press Clause than does an individual under the
Speech Clause.1
Through the first quarter of the twentieth century, courts inter-
preted First Amendment restrictions as extending to the federal gov-
ernment, but not to the states. 2 This changed, however, with such
cases as Gitlow v. New York"3 and Near v. Minnesota."4 In these cases,
the Supreme Court determined that the First Amendment's protection
of free speech extended to the states. The First Amendment was gradu-
ally "incorporated" into the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
26. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 456
(1983).
27. Id. For the relevant language of the First Amendment, see supra note 9.
28. Id. These rights have included "the right to maintain the confidentiality of sources, the
right of access to prisons and courtrooms, the right to keep police from searching newsrooms, and
the right to prevent libel plaintiffs from inquiring into journalists' thought processes." Id.
29. Anderson, supra note 26, at 456.
30. Margaret A. Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First Amendment Privileges,
1978 SuP. CT. REV. 225, 226.
31. Anderson, supra note 26, at 456.
32. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922). This is apparent from the following
language of the Court: "[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the
Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restrictions about 'freedom of
speech'...." Id. at 543.
33. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). In Gitlow a 7-2 majority of the Court upheld the conviction of a
New York Communist under a state criminal anarchy statute for distributing pamphlets advocat-
ing the overthrow of the United States Government. Out of this apparent defeat for free speech,
however, came a victory in the form of Justice William Sanford's language that "freedom of
speech and of the press . . . are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Id. at
666.
34. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In Near a reluctant Court was for the first time asked to void a
state law restricting press freedom under the First Amendment as incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment. By a 5-4-vote they did so, stating: "It is no longer open to doubt that the
liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action." Id. at 707.
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Amendment."8
Arguably, since the late nineteenth century, licenses and taxes
have served as economic impediments to a free press.36 The Court first
addressed this issue in the landmark case of Grosjean v. American
Press Co. 7 In Grosjean the State of Louisiana attempted to impose a
special tax of two percent on gross advertising revenues of newspapers
with circulations over 20,000 copies per week.38 Of the 165 newspapers
in the state, only 13 were affected by the tax, and it was no coincidence
that 12 of those had in the Court's own words "ganged up" on the
powerful demagogic governor, Huey Long.39
The Supreme Court was apparently influenced by the legislative
history of the measure, which showed that it was passed at the behest
of Governor Long as a way of punishing his enemies in the press,"° In
declaring the tax unconstitutional, Justice Sutherland found that the
tax scheme was "bad" because it was actually a tool, though disguised
as a tax, for limiting "the circulation of information to which the pub-
lic is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties."4
While determining the intent of the Framers in drafting constitu-
tional protections such as the First Amendment is an extremely difficult
task, 2 the Supreme Court made an attempt to do so in Grosjean." The
Court recognized that one of the instigations of the American Revolu-
tion was the act of the British government in enforcing stamp duties
imposed upon newspapers in the colonies, supposedly for the purpose of
repressing libels." These duties were known as "taxes on knowledge"
and were extremely unpopular with the colonists who considered their
primary aim to be the prevention of "the acquisition of knowledge by
the people in respect of their governmental affairs."' 45
The Framers were aware of this situation when they included free-
35. WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 575 (1986)
[hereinafter MURPHY].
36. See, e.g., City of Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark Publishing Co., 28 S.E. 959 (Va. 1898);
Cowan v. Fairbrother, 24 S.E. 212 (N.C. 1896); In re Jager, 7 S.E. 605 (S.C. 1888).
37. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
38. Id. at 240-41.
39. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579-
80 (1983).
40. Id.
41. 297 U.S. at 250.
42. MURPHY, supra note 35, at 303-04. See also Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 583 n.6.
43. 297 U.S. at 248-49.
44. Id. at 246-48.
45. Id. at 246-47.
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dom of speech and freedom of the press in the First Amendment to the
Constitution.46 Their intent was that such "taxes on knowledge" would
be restricted by these First Amendment protections."7 As Grosjean in-
volved a similar attempt by the Louisiana legislature to limit the acqui-
sition of knowledge, the Court held the tax scheme void under the
Constitution."8
Grosjean was used by media plaintiffs to challenge state tax
schemes over the next forty-seven years.49 Based upon Grosjean, lower
courts recognized the legitimacy of two arguments.50 First, state tax
schemes which either "intended to coerce or had the inevitable effect of
coercing the press" violate the First Amendment.5 Second, the media
receives no constitutional immunity from the application of a state's
general tax laws .5 2
During this same period, another case, unrelated to free speech,
arose to indirectly support the imposition of taxes on the media. In
Madden v. Kentucky55 the Court ruled that state legislatures have
broad discretion in determining taxation classifications.54 The Court
suggested a special status for tax laws, stating "in taxation, even more
than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classifi-
cation." 55 Furthermore, in order to overcome the presumption of consti-
tutionality, a challenger must show that the tax is "a hostile and op-
pressive discrimination against particular persons and classes," and
that no conceivable basis exists that might support it.56
Although the Court considered a state's right to tax so important
as to necessitate staunch protection, it later recognized that First
Amendment protections were at least equally important. In 1943, the
46. Id. at 248.
47. Id. at 247.
48. Id. at 249-51.
49. Todd F. Simon, All the News That's Fit to Tax: First Amendment Limitations on State
and Local Taxation of the Press, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 59, 62 (1985). In his article, Simon
recognizes the evolution of what he refers to as a "tripartite first amendment doctrine" in refer-
ence to "non-media first amendment cases." Id. at 64. This doctrine apparently arose from the tax
challenges which constituted the aftermath of Grosjean. Id.
50. Id. at 62-64.
51. Id. at 62. See, e.g., City of Baltimore v. A.S. Abell Co., 145 A.2d 111 (Md. 1958).
52. Simon, supra note 49, at 62. See. e.g., Giragi v. Moore, 64 P.2d 819 (Ariz. 1937).
53. 309 U.S. 83 (1940). This case concerned a Fourteenth Amendment due process chal-
lenge to a state imposed tax on deposits in Kentucky banks. Id. at 84-85.
54. Id. at 87-88.
55. Id. at 88 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Court held in Murdock v. Pennsylvania5 7 that taxes on "the enjoyment
of a right granted by the federal constitution," such as "[a] license tax
applied to activities guaranteed by the First Amendment," were not
within the state's power to impose.58 This principle has been used by
newspapers in challenging government control of distribution methods59
and by broadcasters in challenging government restrictions on the
broadcast media. 60
The prohibition against direct taxation of First Amendment activi-
ties was to represent part of "First Amendment doctrine."'" Another
part of this doctrine arose from an innovative method of analysis
known as First Amendment equal protection. 62 First Amendment rights
are fundamental.6" Consequently, classifications regulating when and
where one may exercise those rights are subject to strict judicial
scrutiny."
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley 5 the Supreme Court
invalidated a statute prohibiting pickets and demonstrations within 150
feet of local schools, but exempting "peaceful picketing" caused by a
labor dispute within the school. 66 Although the Court based its decision
on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds, the opinion spoke
of "first amendment values and primarily cites first amendment cases
as authority."6 In addressing the relationship between the equality
principle and the First Amendment, the Court observed that "[t]here is
an 'equality of status in the field of ideas,' and government must afford
57. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). This case concerned not only freedom of speech, but also freedom
of religion. Id.
58. Id. at 113.
59. Simon, supra note 49, at 64. See, e.g., Southern New Jersey Newspapers, Inc. v. New
Jersey Dep't of Transp., 542 F. Supp. 173 (D.N.J. 1982).
60. Simon, supra note 49, at 64. See, e.g., Weaver v. Jordan, 411 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 844 (1966).
61. Simon, supra note 49, at 64.
62. Simon, supra note 49, at 65.
63. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816-17 (2d ed. 1983).
64. Id. Strict judicial scrutiny is a standard imposed upon measures which adversely affect a
fundamental right. The government must demonstrate that the law is justified by a compelling
state interest and that the distinctions it creates "are necessary to further some governmental
purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1991). The Court has applied this standard to
state laws which interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties protected by the
Constitution. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-42 (1973).
65. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
66. Id. at 94.
67. Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 20, 27 (1975).
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all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard."68
Two parts of the First Amendment doctrine-no taxes on purely
First Amendment activities and equal protection of individual speakers
and the press 69-- came together in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue.7 0 The Court71 struck down a
Minnesota tax scheme which favored small publishers over large ones.72
The Court stated that a general tax scheme including the media would
be constitutionally sound, but held that this scheme constituted a spe-
cial tax on certain publications, violating the First Amendment guaran-
tee of free speech.73
The majority found that Minnesota's tax scheme was passed with-
out intent to censor or discriminate. 7' Nonetheless, the Court concluded
that a tax may still violate the First Amendment even in the absence of
improper legislative intent.75 The Court also found that the Minnesota
tax violated Fourteenth Amendment equal protection since it penalized
large publishers and favored small ones. 7' Additionally, the majority
noted the great "potential for abuse" in the tax scheme as a reason for
striking it down.7 7 Finally, the Court found that differential taxation of
the media, "unless justified by some special characteristic of the press
. . . is presumptively unconstitutional. 7 8
This was the first time the Court had ever "stated that First
Amendment rights were presumptively infringed by a statute [or]
tax." 7 9 The challenging party had previously been required to prove
68. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)).
69. Simon, supra note 49, at 68.
70. 460 U.S. 575 (1983). The case concerned a 1971 amendment to a sales tax law adding
a use tax on the value of ink and paper used by any publishing business. An additional amend-
ment in 1974 exempted the first $100,000 of ink and paper used annually from the tax-thereby
favoring small publishers at the expense of those who published in large volume. As a result of the
exemption, only 14 of 388 newspapers in the state incurred a tax liability in 1974. Id. at 577-79.
71. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority. Id. at 576.
72. Id. at 593.
73. Id. at 581. For a general discussion of the immediate impact left by the decision, see
Rowland L. Young, Tax that Soaks Big Newspapers Violates First Amendment, 69 A.B.A. J. 805
(June 1983).
74. 460 U.S. at 580.
75. Id. at 592.
76. Id. at 591-92.
77. 460 U.S. at 592.
78. Id. at 585.
79. Simon, supra note 49, at 72.
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either "discriminatory intent or ... an infringing effect" of the tax."0
In Minneapolis Star no party presented evidence of either.8 ' Once it
was established that the tax operated to differentially burden the press,
state officials were required to justify it with "a counterbalancing inter-
est of compelling importance."82 The state interest was to be balanced
against the constitutional burden of "singling out the press for
taxation.""3
In Minneapolis Star the Court appeared to adopt a "special status
for the press" approach regarding taxation.' The Court seemed to fol-
low this approach two months later in a nonpress case, Regan v. Taxa-
tion with Representation of Washington,5 in which it "explicitly al-
lowed differential treatment of expression under the Internal Revenue
Code."86 While veterans' organizations were allowed to lobby and still
retain their tax-exempt status, other tax-exempt organizations lost their
exemptions if they engaged in lobbying. 7 The Court held that this dif-
ferential treatment did not violate the First Amendment or principles
of equal protection. 8 The Court explained its holding by returning to
the GrosJean requirement of improper censorial motive which in this
case was missing.8 9 The Court did not bother to cite Minneapolis Star,
in which differential tax treatment of the press had been held inher-
ently suspect. 90
In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland9 the Supreme
Court, rather than utilizing the Minneapolis Star presumption of un-
80. Simon, supra note 49, at 72.
81. Simon, supra note 49, at 72.
82. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983).
83. Id. at 585 n.7.
84. Simon, supra note 49, at 74.
85. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). This case concerned a nonprofit organization which applied for
tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code and was turned down because it was engaged
in lobbying activity. The Code denied such status to some nonprofit organizations engaged in
lobbying, while allowing it to others. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the tax-exemp-
tion statute. Id. at 541-43.
86. Simon, supra note 49, at 74 n.134 (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 548).
87. Simon, supra note 49, at 74 n.134 (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 543).
88. Regan, 461 U.S. at 548-51.
89. Id. at 548 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).
90. 461 U.S. at 540.
91. 481 U.S. 221 (1987). This case concerned a magazine publisher who brought suit to
challenge an Arkansas sales tax scheme which exempted newspapers and "religious, professional,
trade, and sports journals," but not magazines of general interest. Id. at 224-25.
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constitutionality to invalidate a state tax on the media, relied upon an-
other argument. The Court held that an Arkansas sales tax scheme,
which taxed general interest magazines but exempted newspapers and
certain professional journals, violated the First Amendment.92 In doing
so, it stated that the sales tax scheme was content-based and discrimi-
nated against a small group of magazines." Evidence of "improper
censorial motive" was held unnecessary to establish a constitutional vi-
olation where the tax scheme posed "a particular danger of abuse by
the State.""' Content-based tax classifications, it was determined, pre-
sent such a danger and thus violate the First Amendment's guarantee
of freedom of the press.95
During this development period in the law of media taxation, cable
television was recognized as an important conduit of First Amendment
free speech.96
In 1991, the Court addressed First Amendment taxation of the
Arkansas cable industry in Leathers v. Medlock.97 The Court9" af-
firmed that cable television constitutes speech protected under the First
Amendment.99 Additionally, the operation of cable television is part of
the press.100 However, the Court also stated that First Amendment
concerns are not raised merely because cable is taxed differently from
other media.10' Special circumstances must be present before a tax dis-
criminating among speakers is deemed constitutionally suspect."0 2
Relying upon Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers', the Court
concluded that proof of discriminatory legislative intent is not neces-
sary to invalidate a differential tax on First Amendment grounds.'
92. Id. at 234.
93. Id. at 229-30.
94. Id. at 228.
95. Id. at 229-30 (citing Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984)).
96. See Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986). In Pre-
ferred Communications, the Court found that cable operators serve the same core press function
of communication of ideas as do traditional communications media such as newspapers, books,
and public speakers, and thus are to be entitled the same First Amendment protections. Id. at
494.
97. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
98. The majority opinion was written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. Id. at 1440.
99. Id. at 1442.
100. Id. See also Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494
(1986).
101. 111 S. Ct. at 1442.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1442-43.
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The tax, however, must not single out the press for special treatment or
target a small, narrowly defined group.104 Narrowing the principle ex-
pressed in Minneapolis Star, the Court stated that differential taxation
of speakers is constitutionally suspect only where it threatens to sup-
press the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints, or where it
targets a small group to shoulder the entire tax burden. 10 5 In such
cases, the Court reasoned, the tax resembles a penalty for that
group.106
The Court found that the Arkansas sales tax scheme met neither
of these criteria. 0 It represented merely the extension of a tax of gen-
eral applicability, and this type of tax had been repeatedly upheld by
the courts. 0 8 Furthermore, the Arkansas tax did not single out the
press and thus threaten to hinder it as a "watchdog of government ac-
tivity."' 0 9 In addition, the Court determined the tax was not a pur-
poseful attempt to target cable television by interfering with its First
Amendment activities." 0 Nor did it select a narrow base to wholly
shoulder the tax burden."'
The primary danger that the Court recognized was the threat of
state censorship. 1'2 In determining whether state legislation violates the
First Amendment, the Court concluded that an important factor is
whether the legislation distorts the market for ideas."' Two examples
would be a tax imposed on a small number of speakers who represent a
limited range of views and regulations justified by and based upon the
content of the "spoken" material."" In Leathers, neither of the above
were present since the Arkansas tax affected many cable operators op-
erating throughout the state who offered a wide variety of
programming.11 5
As there was no evidence that the material on cable differs system-
atically in its message from that conveyed by other communications
104. Id. at 1443.
105. Id. at 1442-43.
106. Id. at 1443.
107. Id. at 1444.
108. Id. (citing as an example, Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California,
493 U.S. 378 (1990)).
109. 111 S. Ct. at 1444.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1445.
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media, the Court found that cable television is not unique, but instead
"offers subscribers a variety of programming that presents a mixture of
news, information, and entertainment." '116 Therefore, the tax on cable
was not content-based. 1 7 Neither did it act to suppress a narrow range
of ideas. 1 8
The Court held that an "additional basis" must be present to con-
clude that the state has violated cable petitioners' First Amendment
rights." '9 Cable petitioners argued that such a basis existed since in-
termedia and intramedia discrimination existed for a time. 20 The
Court, however, rejected the argument that this discrimination
presented an "additional basis" sufficient to create a First Amendment
violation. 21
Citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation,22 the Court ruled
that in order for a discriminatory tax scheme to implicate the First
Amendment, it must discriminate on the basis of ideas.1 23 Furthermore,
by its very nature, the power to tax also yields the power to make dis-
criminatory classifications. 24 The Court then recognized the broad lati-
tude legislatures have in making classifications in tax statutes. 25
So long as it is included in a generally applicable tax, speech may
be taxed within the bounds of the Constitution. 26 The Court addition-
ally concluded that First Amendment concerns are not raised by a
mere showing that a burden affects speakers differently. 12
7
The Court determined that Arkansas' tax constituted the extension
of a generally: applicable sales tax to cable television services. 8 Fur-
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)).
120. 111 S. Ct. at 1445.
121. Id.
122. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
123. 111 S. Ct. at 1445-46.
124. Id. at 1446. The Court cited Regan as support for the proposition that "inherent in the
power to tax is the power to discriminate in taxation." Id.
125. Id. The Court relied upon Madden v. Kentucky to show that in taxation, local legisla-
tures "possess the greatest freedom in classification" so that the presumption of constitutionality
which attaches to the tax schemes they impose may be overcome only by an explicit showing that
the discrimination is hostile and oppressive. Id. (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88
(1940)).
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946)).
128. Id. at 1447.
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thermore, the Court found that the tax was broad-based and content-
neutral, with no record indicating it was either intended for, or would
have the likely effect of, stifling the free exchange of ideas. 1 9 As a
result, the Court concluded that the tax did not violate the First
Amendment guarantee of free speech or free press. 1 0
The dissent's' relied more on recent case law, especially Minneap-
olis Star.' Justice Marshall contended that freedom of the press was
designed to prohibit the "government from using the tax power to dis-
criminate against individual members of the media or against the me-
dia as a whole."1 83 Consequently, media actors must be treated equally
in terms of taxing."3 Justice Marshall argued that the majority ignored
equal treatment among information mediums when stating that it is
constitutionally permissible to treat some media actors differently "so
long as the more heavily taxed medium is not too 'small' in number.' 35
Next, the dissent argued that the Court's decisions on selective
taxation in the past have established a nondiscrimination principle for
similarly-situated members of the press. 136 Such differential treatment
is presumptively unconstitutional unless justified by a sufficiently com-
pelling state interest. 13 7 Justice Marshall stated that the nondiscrimina-
tion principle has previously been applied in two contexts: (1) to "pro-
hibit[] the State from imposing on the media tax burdens not borne by
like-situated nonmedia enterprises '3 38 and (2) to "prohibit[] the State
from taxing individual members of the press unequally.' 3 9 The issue is
"whether the nondiscrimination principle prohibits the State from sin-
gling out a particular information medium for tax burdens not borne
by other media."' ° The same "principles [which] animate [the] selec-
tive-taxation cases [in the past] clearly condemn this form of
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent was written by Justice Marshall and joined
by Justice Blackmun. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1447-48.
136. Id. at 1448.
137. Id.
138. Id. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 583-86 (1983).
139. 111 S. Ct. at 1448 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc.
v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987).
140. 111 S. Ct. at 1448 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 14:125
INTRAMEDIA TAX SCHEME
discrimination."14 '
The dissent stated that cable television deserves the same First
Amendment protection as other members of the press." 2 Moreover, the
nondiscrimination principle is designed to "protect[] the press from
[covert] censorship . . [by] condemning any selective-taxation
scheme that presents the 'potential for abuse' by the State.' 43 Justice
Marshall found that by granting the government the power "to dis-
criminate among like-situated media," such a risk was created.144
The dissent continued, stating that "differential taxation within an
information medium distorts the marketplace of ideas" since not all
intermedia competitors share the same burdens.4 5 Consequently, where
the differential taxation occurs across different media, but those media
compete in the same information market, the marketplace of ideas is
distorted for the same reasons.'" In Leathers, the relevant media did
compete in the same information market. 14  Justice Marshall argued
that the Arkansas tax, therefore, distorted the marketplace of ideas. 14 8
Consumer preferences were also distorted since the tax impaired "the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antago-
nistic sources."' 9
The dissent argued that the burden of proof was on the State to
prove that the "'differential treatment' of cable television [was] justi-
fied by some 'special characteristic' . . . or by some other 'counterbal-
ancing interest of compelling importance that [the State] cannot
achieve without differential taxation.' ",150 There was no evidence that
the taxing scheme was related to any social cost of cable television or to
any special characteristics of cable television service.' 51 The only justifi-
cation given by the State was "its interest in raising revenue."'5 2 Jus-
tice Marshall concluded that "[t]his interest is not sufficiently compel-
141. Id. at 1449.
142. Id. (citing Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)).
143. Id. (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 592 (1983)).
144. 111 S. Ct. at 1449 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1450 (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)).
146. 111 S. Ct. at 1450 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
150. 111 S. Ct. at 1450 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983)).
151. 111 S. Ct. at 1450 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
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ling to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality under the
nondiscrimination principle."'15 3
Contrary to the majority, the dissent found that cable television
does offer unique contributions to the public which cannot be found in
other media, such as religious programming and the Spanish-language
network. 154 Therefore, there was a risk in the Arkansas tax scheme,
similar to that of direct content-based regulation, of suppressing only a
limited range of views.1 55
Justice Marshall argued that the majority ignored the great poten-
tial for abuse inherent in granting the State power to discriminate
based on medium identity so long as the medium is sufficiently large
and does not single out too few actors. 56 A tax scheme imposing differ-
ential burdens on like-situated members of the press violates the First
Amendment, even when structured in a manner that is content-neutral,
because it poses the risk that the State might abuse this power.',57
Justice Marshall argued that the majority's reliance on Regan, for
the proposition that a discriminatory tax scheme must discriminate on
the basis of ideas in order to implicate the First Amendment, ignored
the fact that Regan did not deal with the press or take into account its
special status in the eyes of the law. 158 Such reliance, moreover, "would
essentially annihilate the nondiscrimination principle"' 59 since Gros-
jean, Minneapolis Star, and Arkansas Writers' stand for the principle
"that the 'power to tax' does not include 'the power to discriminate'
when the press is involved." 60
Finally, the dissent found the majority's reliance on Mabee and
Walling to be misplaced since these two cases justified differential
treatment of the press by a state policy unrelated to speech, and such a
policy was not present in this case.' 61 Justice Marshall concluded that
the taxing scheme of both Act 769 and Act 188 violated the First
Amendment by singling out a particular medium for disproportionate
taxation and was therefore unconstitutional.'12
153. Id. (citing Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)).
154. 111 S. Ct. at 1451 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1452.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1453.
159. Id. at 1452.
160. Id. at 1452-53.
161. Id. at 1453-54 n.4.
162. Id. at 1448.
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The decision in Leathers, while unlikely to result in the full-scale
government abuse apparently predicted by the dissent,168 has dealt a
blow to those who had high hopes for the Minneapolis Star decision.
The Leathers Court has disappointed those hopes by basically ignoring
the Minneapolis Star presumption of unconstitutionality inherent in
differential taxation of the press.' 6' The growth of this doctrine was
stunted by the Court's refusal to extend the presumption to differential
taxation of different media. 6 '
The nondiscrimination principle, discussed in such detail by the
dissent, appears to have lost a good deal of its potency by the majority's
refusal to extend it to the singling out of a particular medium in the
press. 66 Equally emasculated is the principle of First Amendment
equal protection. 16 7 The Court virtually ignores the principle.6 8 The
conclusion seems to be that equal protection applies only on a small
scale, becoming irrelevant once that scale significantly expands.16 9
This decision was a victory for general tax schemes. Apparently,
any tax which operates to differentially burden some media more than
others may escape the strict scrutiny of the Court by being labelled a
tax of general application.170 A question arises as to the consequences
163. Id. at 1452. The dissent appears to predict that the "potential for abuse inherent in the
State's power to discriminate based on medium identity" will allow it to single out a medium for
higher taxes simply because the state doesn't like it or because it wishes "to confer an advantage
upon the medium's competitors." Id.
164. Id. at 1442-43. The Court instead focused on the fact that the Minnesota tax singled
out a small group of newspapers. From this it concluded that the tax scheme must threaten to
suppress particular ideas becoming constitutionally suspect. Id. at 1443-44.
165. Id. at 1443, 1448. Although the Court pays lip service to the presumption by citing the
relevant language in Minneapolis Star, it never addresses whether it should or should not be
applied in this case. Id. at 1443.
166. Id. at 1452. The dissent appears to recognize this when it concludes that the majority's
interpretations of certain cases "would essentially annihilate the nondiscrimination principle." Id.
167. The fact that the Court has allowed one communications medium to be taxed more
heavily than others, thereby making the ideas derived from that medium relatively more expensive
than those attained from other media, appears inconsistent with the statement: "government must
afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard." Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
168. "The majority never develops any theory of the State's obligation to treat like-situated
media equally, except to say that the State must avoid discriminating against too 'small' a number
of media actors." 111 S. Ct. at 1451 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. While the Court condemns differentially taxing small groups with a limited range of
views, it has allowed the differential taxation of an entire medium where that medium "offer[s] a
wide variety of programming." 111 S. Ct. at 1444-45. The number of affected actors is also im-
portant, so that at some level between three and 100, differential taxation is no longer constitu-
tionally suspect. Id. at 1451.
170. Id. at 1444. The Court sees no risk in such taxes since they do not constitute "a pen-
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of a legislature imposing a "general tax" exempting all media except
one. It seems, from the majority opinion, that this tax would be consti-
tutionally permissible so long as no discriminatory intent could be
found on the part of the legislature, and the tax does not burden too
small a number of actors with too limited a set of views.' 71 Although
perhaps workable in theory, this appears much more difficult to apply
than the general "per se" rule of Minneapolis Star."2
Although the practical short-term effect of the decision should be
slight, the long-term implications may be a different matter. As the
dissent vehemently argues, the potential now exists for state legislatures
to suppress the dissemination of certain ideas and viewpoints.17 3 If the
Court continues along the path forged by the majority, the communica-
tion of new and unique ideas may become substantially more expensive
in the future.
The refusal to extend First Amendment protections to a growing
communications medium portends danger for other up and coming
communication media. To name a few, satellite television, computer
bulletin boards, CD ROM, fax machines, and video access technology
are all in various early stages of growth. Each is a separate medium of
communication capable of expressing certain ideas and viewpoints dis-
tinct from those expressed through other media. Where these view-
points offend legislators or their constituencies, legislators now have a
tool, the "generally applicable" tax scheme, to deal with them.1 7
Another adversely affected group may be the small, cable-depen-
dent broadcasters which often provide quality educational, creative,
and specialized programming. 175 These broadcasters, due to their rela-
alty for a few." Id. (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983)).
171. Id. at 1444-47.
172. This "per se" rule indicates that "differential tax treatment of the media is inherently
suspect." Simon, supra note 49, at 76.
173. 111 S. Ct. at 1452 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The State may extend general taxes,
which previously did not affect any media, to cable television. By doing so, rates would presuma-
bly rise, and certain people (without the discretionary income to afford the rate hikes) would be
discouraged from receiving into their homes such viewpoints as may be gained by religious pro-
gramming, foreign language programming, etc. See id. at 1451.
174. In such a scenario, a "generally applicable" tax scheme could be extended to all disfa-
vored media while exempting newspapers, network television stations, and other media transmit-
ting more politically popular material. The only caveat is that the medium must be large enough
so that the tax does not resemble a "penalty for a few." Id. at 1444.
175. Some well-known examples include the Public Broadcasting System (PBS), Arts and
Entertainment (A&E), and the Discovery Channel.
[Vol. 14:125
INTRAMEDIA TAX SCHEME
tively small audiences, may find it difficult to bring in heavy advertising
revenues. They are therefore likely to operate close to the break-even
point, relying heavily upon viewer donations to stay in business.
Once cable companies are taxed, those taxes are certain to be
passed along in some way not only to subscribers, but also to the broad-
casters which the cable companies carry, perhaps through smaller pay-
ment schedules. It will be the financially strained stations that find this
burden most difficult to bear. Such stations are likely to be the broad-
casters described above, including those presenting narrowly focused
entertainment or viewpoints without great popular appeal. Burdening
such information sources through government action, unshared by their
competitors, would surely be an anathema to the Framers of our
Constitution.
This decision represents a turning point in a long line of cases de-
termining just how far the state may go in taxing the press without
violating the First Amendment. While Minneapolis Star appeared a
victory for those who would expand First Amendment protections,
Leathers demonstrated that those hopes were built on a young and
fragile foundation. Leathers has simultaneously eroded that foundation
and taken the law in a new direction, unfavorable to those benefitted by
a broad reading of the First Amendment. By checking the development
of Minneapolis Star and its progeny, the states have advanced one step
further into the ranks of the First Amendment protections of the press.
John W. Campbell
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